Comment on The Prior Convictions Exception: Examining the Continuing Viability of Almendarez-Torres Under Alleyne by Flynn, Kevin
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 1 Article 11
Winter 1-1-2015
Comment on The Prior Convictions Exception:




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Student Notes Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington &
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin Flynn, Comment on The Prior Convictions Exception: Examining the Continuing Viability of




Comment on The Prior Convictions 
Exception: Examining the Continuing 
Viability of Almendarez-Torres Under 
Alleyne 
Kevin Flynn 
I am a career prosecutor with the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and I have been instructed to begin by stating that I am 
submitting this comment in my personal and not my professional 
capacity. My Department certainly knows the virtue of starting 
off a piece with a compelling opening line. 
For more than twenty-five years, I have been a violent crime 
prosecutor in a city that has suffered more than its share of street 
tragedy. The caseloads that I once maintained as a line attorney 
and now supervise as a manager are dauntingly high: the 
average misdemeanor prosecutor handles as many as 150 cases 
at a time, the average felony prosecutor as many as 50 to 75, even 
the average homicide prosecutor in excess of 15 or 20. The 
motions practice is very high-volume but predominantly centers 
on defense evidentiary challengers under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, and the subject matters can be repetitive. I would 
not say that the practice on a day-to-day basis involves an array 
of refined legal issues. In fact, it could probably be summed up in 
two words: boilerplate responses. So I am not necessarily the best 
qualified person to address the acuity of this Note’s analysis or 
the rigorousness of its research. On that point, I can at least say 
that, even though it has been many years since I reviewed a piece 
of legal scholarship, I do know good writing when I see it, and 
this is not good but excellent writing: cogent, well-phrased, well-
argued across the board, and a joy to read. I never thought I 
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would write the last four words of the previous sentence about a 
law review article. 
Having said that, if I can make a useful contribution to this 
publication it is not as a sophisticated legal commentator but 
rather—channeling here my inner David Foster Wallace—as an 
emissary from the real world. Mine is a world where the issues 
that the Note discusses have very real potential consequences for 
defendants, victims, and the public servants who labor (more 
than the public we serve has any idea) to achieve justice in every 
case that comes before us.  
Let me start by recounting an anecdote about the first time 
that a significant case of mine was affected by the case, Apprendi 
v. New Jersey,1 that started the movement discussed in the Note.2 
Twenty-one years ago, I took to trial a defendant who had 
committed a double homicide almost unimaginable in its 
brutality. Following his conviction, the defendant was sentenced 
to two terms of life without parole based on the aggravating 
factor of the unique atrociousness of his crimes. Without 
exploring the garish details, suffice it to say that the murders 
were of such a nature that any reasonable person would believe it 
important in a civilized society for the sentence of that defendant 
to state unequivocally that he would spend the rest of his days in 
jail. The atrociousness of the murders was never questioned by 
the defense at trial, which simply argued before the jury that, 
however horrific they were, they were committed by someone 
other than the defendant. On appeal, the defendant’s convictions 
were affirmed, but his sentence was ultimately reduced because 
the Court of Appeals retroactively found an Apprendi violation in 
that the grand jury had not been asked to consider and 
specifically find in its indictment the aggravating factor of 
atrociousness—notwithstanding that that matter was never 
debated and was always conceded by the defense at trial. While 
the defendant still received a lengthy term of incarceration at his 
post-appeal resentencing, he retains the hope, albeit slight, of one 
day knowing freedom again. The Note refers several times to “the 
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Apprendi Revolution.”3 To carry the metaphor one step further, it 
might be said in retrospect that, in at least this case, the cause of 
just and appropriate sentencing was hit by a stray 
jurisprudential Molotov cocktail in that revolution. 
Looking at the more narrow issue discussed in the Note, if it 
is not ultimately resolved in the manner endorsed by the 
author—with the survival of the prior conviction exception4—the 
implications for countless criminal prosecutions in every state in 
the nation would be vast. By way of example, one only has to 
examine the interplay between this issue and another Supreme 
Court case, Crawford v. Washington.5 Crawford held that out-of-
court statements that are “testimonial” in nature—defined as 
“made with an eye toward court”—constitute inadmissible 
hearsay;6 it fundamentally changed the practices of prosecutors 
across the country by, among other things, requiring them to 
produce live witnesses to establish facts that heretofore could be 
adduced by documentary evidence. The practical applications of 
Crawford are still being sorted out. It is a live question, for 
instance, whether an autopsy report in a homicide case—
scientific in nature but commonly prepared by forensic 
pathologists who later testify in court about their findings—are 
testimonial in nature, such that a prosecutor handling a decades-
old murder case in which the original forensic pathologist has 
become unavailable could be barred from admitting the report to 
establish the cause and manner of the decedent’s death.  
How do Crawford, Apprendi, Almendarez-Torres and Alleyne 
come together here? In just this way: Were the prior conviction 
exception to be eliminated, the government’s ability to prove a 
defendant’s recidivist status by way of criminal history 
documents would be severely hampered if not destroyed, possibly 
requiring live appearances by records clerks in every case. Given 
                                                                                                     
 3. See id. at Introduction (introducing the Apprendi revolution). 
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sustainable on constitutional grounds and that overturning Almendarez-Torres 
would impose severe costs on the judicial system). 
 5. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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the fact that repeat offenders cannot be relied on to confine their 
criminality to one particular county, state, or even region, it is by 
no means hysterical to contemplate that the end result could be 
that in a given case the government would have to transport 
multiple records custodians from multiple jurisdictions simply to 
establish something that can be presently (and appropriately) 
proven on paper.  
Now, the reader might be thinking that, if a defendant’s 
constitutional rights are at issue, no amount of governmental 
inconvenience is too burdensome. That is a proposition that I am 
prone to agree with, and one that prosecutors in my office act on 
every day. Case in point: a federal judge recently issued an 
opinion in a civil case finding one of the District of Columbia’s 
firearms laws unconstitutional and enjoining the city from 
continuing to enforce it. The order has been stayed and the city is 
considering its appeal rights, but our office has already 
undertaken the laborious task of identifying pending and prior 
cases that would be affected if the order prevails, and have taken 
steps to change the bond conditions of certain defendants 
awaiting trial on the disputed charge. I do not write about my 
office’s actions in a spirit of self-congratulation—ethical 
prosecutors are trained that, where a legitimate right of a 
criminal defendant stands in the balance, convenience falls by the 
wayside.  
The key word above, of course, is legitimate. The burdens 
discussed above (e.g., having to transport records clerks into a 
courtroom from all over the country and lining them in the 
anteroom to testify about the essentially self-evident) would be 
borne by the government in the service of protecting a right that 
most defendants will not choose to exercise. If there is one thing 
that I have learned over a quarter century of trying criminal 
cases it is this: Defendants do not want their juries to find out 
bad things about them if they do not have to. The details of a 
defendant’s criminal past—the exact nature of the charges of 
which he has previously been convicted—are bad facts for him, 
and faced with the choice of having them come out in all their 
ugliness, as opposed to in sanitized form, a defendant will opt for 
the latter every time. And so how will my hypothetical almost 
always resolve itself? With the government spending time, 
money, and resources to marshal live witnesses on the 
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defendant’s recidivist record only to have his lawyer stand up in 
court and say, “My client stipulates to the fact that he has X 
number of felony convictions.”   
In sum, as a legal treatise Meg’s Note is impressive. But it is 
in its appreciation for and exploration of the practical, real-world 
implications of this issue that it really shines. At the end of the 
day, it demonstrates how sound legal scholarship does not exist 
in a vacuum. From my perspective, when it is written in the field 
in which I labor and it balances erudition and common sense, the 
abstract and the concrete, it serves the public very well. 
